***Robert Myers' Econ Home Page*** 5/4/2006

 
 
Hi, 

            This page is mainly devoted to the presentation of my thoughts and writings about Economics, mostly policy relevant economics affecting Economic Development and Poverty. There are two types of  entries on this page. One, actual HTML text, allows you to directly read the text, either on this page or via a link. The other is a link to a word processing (MS Word) or Acrobat file (PDF file) which must be downloaded before it is read. In any cases involving links, I provide a short description of the contents of the link. Pictures of my family

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Links for Literature Searches

Click on the links for very good research engines.
USAID Development Clearinghouse
Search engine for loads of USAID development documents.
World Bank IMF Library
To get to the search engine keep clicking on the blue icon of the world with "jolis" written in it
Resources for Economists on the Internet(RFE) This is an incredibly muscular research resource.
Research Resources for Social Sciences Craig McKie and McGraw Hill have teamed up to construct this site, also very muscular.

Links to other Policy Sites
     Click on this link and see a list of URLs for other good policy sites. I peruse these sites to see what new, interesting policy papers are available. 

Useful Resource Web Sites

 
Slide Show of Burke Pictures

Link to PDF (easily readable & printable) Copy of my CV

Bob's E-Mail address.

AU Talk 11/30/04

A Concept Paper on Governance

Robert Myers' Book Review of A Free Nation Deep in Debt: The Financial Roots of Democracy by James Macdonald

Think Tank Outline/Article
 
 

 WALK LIKE AN EGYPTIAN

Walking in Cairo, Egypt is an exhilarating adventure which usually ends satisfactorily. It's not to be taken lightly, however. What sets me apart is that I walk alone. Egyptians move in groups or gaggles and primarily use the touch system rather than their eyes and ears to perambulate. Except for collections of sub-teens, who are scurrilous, these groups of walkers are unfailing polite and give way graciously after the requisite number of gentle bumps and touches. Click Here for the Rest

LINKS TO MY WRITINGS

Revisiting Grinnell for My 40th Reunion

Society for International Development Talk on Competition

Lecture at Duke

AUtalk3-30-04

RAISE Writings

Nigeria Notes

Myers Missiles

 LATEST MISSILE
Click Here Other Recent Missiles. 
Short Substantive Notes on Development Issues (Formal vs. informal economies, The need for private employment and saving/investment opportunities, etc.)
A Theory Of Yes Men
This about how the wrong incentives in the World Bank cause dishonesty and toadyism. 

Links to Some of My Notes on Think Tanks (MS Word Files)

Link to Adobe PDF paper, Improving Logical Reasoning in the World Bank.
        This is an 11 page paper exposing the logical fallacies used in most World Bank reports.

A Letter to Finance & Development About Poverty Reform Strategy Papers (PRSPs)
To the Editor- Finance and Development                                           August 6, 2002
IMF Room IS7-1100
700 19th St. NW
Washington, DC 20431

Dear Sir/Madam,

        Your article ("Taking Stock of Poverty Reduction Efforts," F&D, June 2002) stimulated four of us to gather for lunch to discuss the PRSP experience. Together, we have at least 120 years of experience in Development Economics. We discussed several issues, but the most pressing are the following conceptual ones.

        First, PRSPs in their present design put more emphasis on the role of the Government and less on the role of the private sector as the engine to drive the poverty reduction machine through employment creation. Lack of formal sector employment is at the root of poverty in these countries. Only enhanced private sector activity can efficiently alleviate this huge unemployment problem. In addition, enhanced private sector activity will enlarge tax bases, thus providing domestic financing for public sector health, education and social programs aimed at the poor. Without robust formal private sector employment, the true dimensions of the poverty problem can't be tackled.

        Second the interrelationships amongst economic, political and social factors, and poverty are too loosely specified. At present it appears that any and all "good" economic, political and social programs/proposals are considered to be poverty alleviating. This leads to an excessively broad agenda and a "flavor of the month" approach to poverty reduction. We feel that the poverty problem must first be defined in the context of full, formal sector employment. Following that, the PRSPs should apply Ockham's Razor and focus on only those few social, political and economic programs/proposals that are of proven significance to poverty alleviation.

        Finally, we are concerned that the assumed involvement of civil society in the preparation of the PRSP, remains just that—an assumption. Too little attention is focused on the needed capacity to enable private individuals and groups from civil society to contribute meaningfully to the PRSP process. Most Africans have never been asked for their opinion on any subject let alone how to draft an effective PRSP. Entitling people to confidently speak their minds and engage in constructive dialogue gets far too little attention from the Bank, IMF and the respective national governments.
Sincerely,

Mohamed Cassam,   Vita C. Nwaneri,                Robert Myers,                   Donald R. Sherk
cassamm@aol.com   vcnwaneri@yahoo.com     rmyers1@erols.com          donsherk@aol.com

BUSH GENOA DEVELOPMENT GESTURE: WELL MEANING BUT FLAWED
          This is a link to a Myers Missile about WB grants instead of soft loans. If you click on it you can read the Missile and the newspaper article on which is is based.

STRUCTURAL CONDITIONALITY: THE WRONG FOCUS FOR THE IMF
        This is an 11 page MS Word paper submitted to the IMF Board. They are seeking comments on structural conditionality (see their web page: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/struct/index.htm). My position in this paper is that the IMF should not combine lending and structural conditions. Instead it should lend, possibly large amounts of money to prevent contagion in those relatively large, internationally integrated economies that have fairly good policies but experience temporary negative economic shocks. The IMF should drop its "promote growth" goal and extract itself from most of the countries it currently has arrangements with. In addition, until and unless the economically debilitating sovereign debt overhang problems are overcome through some sort of concerted sovereign debt bankruptcy exercises, the IMF will be of limited effectiveness.

The Memo About Jeff Sachs & Co. and Sequencing
        This is an MS Word document about the sequencing of structural conditions.

Lending to a Fault (Letter to the Washington Post. Published on p. B6 on January 7,2001)

The Washington Post                                                                          Dr. Robert Myers
1150 15th St. NW                                                                             3605 Morrison St. NW
Washington, DC 20071                                                                       Washington, DC 20015
                                                                                                            202-966-6458
                                                                                                            rmyers1@erols.com
December 22, 2000
Dear Sir:
         James Wolfensohn's letter Dec. 22 op-ed column was full of disingenuous sentiment and bad economics. The Bank has been the lead culprit in pushing poor countries to borrow excessively.
        I was the economist at the World Bank for Nigeria and then Zambia when these countries began their ruinous borrowing binges. For each, the Bank established enormously high lending targets and then, through a concept called "burden sharing", convinced other lenders to pony up three times as much lending so that the Bank's exposure ratio, or its share of the total debt, would not rise above 25%. In truth, we were engaged in predatory lending.
        Everyone knew that excessive lending was financing consumption rather than investment, but other lenders were assured that huge profits per dollar lent, if not loan repayments, could be financed through additional Bank/IMF lending.
        As economists, we did not then appreciate how socially costly and destructive of development incentives this process of lending-and-forgiveness is. It essentially subjugates borrowers and keeps them forever in penury.
        Writing off the present debt simply will enable the Bank to initiate a new lending/forgiving cycle. Unless the Bank is changed into a much smaller, grant-giving institution, debt forgiveness, although essential, will fail.
        The present World Bank is desperate to continue excessive lending and will seize on anything, even Christmas, to be able to continue.

Sincerely, Robert Myers, Washington

Improving the Development Atmosphere (redrafted on 7/7/2000)
    This is an MS Word downloadable 11 page note on forefront or best practice approaches to improving the development atmosphere. It contains a section on what I see as future trends in the growth process and then ten subsections on particular development issues.

Revised Note: Differences between IDA (Altruistic) and IBRD (Commercial) Lending.
    This is an MS Word downloadable 5 pp. note that sets out some altruistic (very different from the Bank's current practices) principles for IDA lending.

Comments on the Meltzer Report: Can Public-Sector Foreign Debt Alleviate Poverty?
Link to the Meltzer Commission Report

Full 8 Page Text of My Comments in Downloadable MS Word File

 Full 8 Page Text of My Comments in Acrobat Reader File

Here is the concluding paragraph of my comments on this important report:

20. IX. CONCLUSIONS. The Meltzer commission makes generally good recommendations, but vacillates regarding the Bank and does not convincingly support its recommendations. As a result, the report is likely to have little impact, even though the IMF and World Bank are in desperate need of refocusing, reform and, in the case of the Bank, downsizing. Here are the other conclusions.
a. The report should clearly state the importance, to development, poverty alleviation and stabilization, of growth in private investment, employment and productivity in a competitive setting. This would enable it to define steady growth, in these three variables, as the responsibility of the World Bank. Significant negative departures from the growth trend of these variables would be the responsibility of the IMF, which would intervene to mitigate contagion.
b. The commission does not sufficiently stress the fact that the failures of the IMF and World Bank result from incorrect or inappropriate volumes, timing or targeting of money flows rather than from poor or inappropriate policy advice.
c. The report's excellent recommendations that the IMF only lend for -- and the World Bank not lend for -- crises is nullified by the absence of any delineation of what is and what is not a crisis.
d. The commission doesn't recommend, as it should, the cessation of all adjustment or policy-based lending. Adjustment lending is defined by two characteristics. One is that money flows are not targeted and are completely fungible. The other is that disbursements are supposedly contingent upon the adoption of an approved menu of policy reforms. Adjustment lending should be discontinued because disbursements can't be made contingent on policy reforms, because the money flows can't be sized and targeted and because an appropriate policy menu can't be agreed upon.
e. Corruption flourishes when large amounts of money fall into the hands of people/institutions that are not creditworthy. By not making this connection and not discussing the relationship between creditworthiness and World Bank and IMF lending, the commission mishandles the corruption issue.
f. The commission has, perhaps grudgingly, endorsed more World Bank lending to alleviate poverty, although with the important proviso that Bank lending be drastically cut in favor of (much smaller amounts of) grants. Unfortunately, greater external public sector debt exacerbates poverty. The commission avoids a discussion of what constitutes poverty and the role that growth in private sector employment and productivity in a competitive setting can play in poverty alleviation. As a result, it fails to direct the Bank on how to correctly size and target grants to increase employment and productivity, so as to alleviate poverty.
g. Finally there is an issue of how the World Bank might finance grants. The Meltzer Report is essentially silent on this. A possibility that is consistent with current practices would be for the World Bank to reduce costs, increase its investment income and institute differential interest rate charges so as to accumulate greater earnings or "profits". If these are complemented with stringent administrative cost controlling measures, the Bank could well accumulate sufficient annual funds to finance an appropriate volume of development grants, or directly targeted subsidies.

The World Bank & Joe Stiglitz VS. Relevance
        This is a short note that compares a paper by Joe Stiglitz with a paper on altruism. The purpose is to demonstrate the importance of assessing the market and development impact of World Bank loan transfers rather than just of the policies recommended along with the loans.

The Importance of Domestic Debt Rather than Foreign Borrowing
        This is a downloadable MS Word document which argues that developing countries need to have their own domestic debt (bond) markets. Having such markets will provide good opportunities for domestic savers and investor and will enormously strengthen domestic financial markets, thus reducing tendencies for financial instability and dependence on the world Bank and IMF.
 


Me & Little Five

MY E-Mail Entitled, "Development, Labor Unions & Donor Lending" About James People's Article, Including the Table.
    This is an EM, in readable HTML format, about how making labor markets more competitive can increase employment and reduce poverty as long as excessive Donor lending doesn't frustrate attempts to make factor markets more competitive. It includes a table of empirical results.

My Letter to the Washington Post, Published on p. A10 on 1/5/99
To the Editor of the Washington Post
Via E-Mail
                                                                                                December 30, 1998
Dear Sir:

            THE IMF DOESN'T REPLY

        Vito Tanzi's letter to the Post, (12/30/98, p. A-18) responding to Carol Welch's very informed letter condemning the IMF and World Bank (the Post, Letters, 12/8/98) is disingenuous and in no sense a reply. Carol's points are that ruling cliques, e.g. in Indonesia and Russia, get billions of dollars of grant-like loans by promising to undertake hundreds of policy reforms, most of which they repeatedly ignore. Meanwhile these ruling cliques, who control their economies as well as their government budgets, spend these billions in ways which worsen distribution of income (poverty) and environmental problems. Most remarkable, given economic theory, is that these billions of lending are accompanied by increases in unemployment. Vito's main defense is that client governments of the IMF and World Bank sign letters of intent saying they will do whatever these august institutions want them to do. The fact that poverty, unemployment and environmental destruction persist, if not increase, leaves Vito to contend that either the governments repeatedly don't abide by IMF/World Bank policy prescriptions or that the policy recommendations are wrong. Vito says, "the allegation [that IMF policies have been an environmental disaster] is patently untrue." In this he is correct. It is the billions of dollars of IMF/World Bank lending which is exacerbating environmental, unemployment and poverty problems in Indonesia and Russia.
                                                                                    Sincerely,
                                                                                                       Robert Myers
                                                                                        (Long-time World Bank Employee)
 

                            John Cassidy, Keynes, Asia and the IMF

Hi Friends and Colleagues,                                                                         October 26, 1998
 

John Cassidy has a delightful and weighty piece entitled, "The New Economic Disorder" in the Oct. 26 & Nov. 2, 1998 New Yorker. The article is about John Maynard Keynes (JMK), a fascinating person and brilliant economist who was skeptical and disparaging of officialdom, and about the present need for Keynesian endorsed controls on international capital flows to mitigate Asian Contagion. Cassidy concentrates on JMK's financial pronouncements, thereby de-emphasizing Keynes' most important economic policy maxim, to wit: IF IT CAUSES NON-FRICTIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT, IT ISN'T WORKING. Cassidy's article led me to wonder what JMK would propose if he were around today. I think events, particularly relating to World Bank (WB) and IMF behavior, would have strengthened his disrespect of officialdom. I also believe that JMK would have incorporated into his theoretical analysis several advances in the profession, particularly from the field of Industrial Organization, relating to moral hazard, cartel and monopoly behavior and bankruptcy. He also would have observed and pronounced upon an egregious anomaly relating to his General Theory: That low investment and employment problems can be mitigated by government deficits financed domestically, but these problems are worsened at least in the longer- term if the deficits are financed from abroad. JMK would most probably view this failing of the WB/IMF (that the more governments rely on the WB/IMF (Donor) lending, the lower is their formal sector, private employment) as paramount. He would probably have cared relatively less about controls on private capital flows. Instead he would have examined more closely why and how huge amounts of official, concessional (Donor) lending exacerbate moral hazard problems, support destructive cartel or monopoly behavior and bail out large, inefficient enterprises which otherwise should be fragmented via bankruptcy. All of these ultimately reduce formal, private sector employment. I feel that JMK would still recommend government deficits and enhanced liquidity to stimulate investment and employment, when needed. However, he would argue that the deficits be financed via local currency denominated debt issues sold in competitive, mainly domestic markets, rather than via international borrowing, including from the World Bank and IMF.

Near the end of his article, Cassidy says in part, "If the IMF is to become a credible institution, it needs a limited mission (to provide liquidity in international crises, not to act as a nation-builder)...". JMK would agree with both parts of the parenthetical statement, although he would have had to be an extreme insider to understand what it means for Donors to act as nation- builders. However, once understood, I am sure Keynes would have been appalled that nation-building rather than employment is the World Bank's and IMF's (the Donors') goal. He would have been vociferously and effectively against it.

                                                                           Warm regards, Bob Myers
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